ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In a client/server system scenario, usually a password-based authentication scheme with smart card is widely used in order to identify the validity of a remote user [1] , [4] , [10] . Traditional remote identity-based authentication schemes [2] , [5] are based on passwords and thus the security of these schemes is based on the passwords only. But, simple passwords are always easy to break using simple dictionary attacks [6] . Thus, to overcome such problems, cryptographic secret keys and passwords are suggested to be used in the remote user authentication schemes. However, the long and random cryptographic keys are difficult to memorize and hence they must be stored somewhere, and it makes expensive to maintain the long cryptographic keys in practice. The drawback with remote user authentication schemes using cryptographic keys and passwords is that they are unable to provide non-repudiation because cryptographic keys and passwords can be forgotten, lost or even they may be shared with other people and as a result there is no way to know who is the actual user. Generally, a secure and efficient remote user authentication scheme should meet the following conditions [7 ] :
• Compatibility with a multi-server network architecture without repetitive registration.
• Low computational workload of the smart card.
• No need of password table or verification table. • Resistance to different kinds of attacks.
• Allow the user to choose his/her identifier, password and update his/her password freely.
• Allow the users and servers to authenticate each other and then negotiate a session key to security communication.
• No requirement on time synchronization and delay-time limitation.
On the other hand, recent biometric-based remote user authentication schemes along with passwords have drawn considerable research attention [3] , [6] , [7] , [8] . There are many advantages of using biometric keys (for example, fingerprints, faces, irises, hand geometry and palm-prints, etc.) as compared to traditional passwords, which are (as described in [6] )
• Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten.
• Biometric keys are very difficult to copy or share.
• Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute.
• Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily.
• Someone's biometrics is not easy to break than others Biometric-based remote user authentications are thus inherently more reliable and secure than usual traditional password-based remote user authentication schemes.
In 1981, Lamport first introduced the notion of remote authentication scheme [4] in which a remote server can authenticate a remote user based on identity and password over an insecure network. Lamport's scheme requires to store the verification tables for this purpose. Later in 1998, Jan and Chen proposed a password-based authentication scheme [12] . However, their scheme does not require to store the verification tables in the system as compared with Lamport's scheme. Jan and Chen's scheme is ineffective in the sense that the server needs to maintain the verification tables and thus the size of the verification tables are proportional to the number of users. In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a remote user authentication scheme with the help of smart cards [13] . Their scheme is based on ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [14] . Hwang and Li's scheme does not require to store password table in the system and it only needs to maintain one secret key. As a result, Hwang and Li's scheme is effective compared with [4] , [12] .
In 2002, Lee et al. proposed a fingerprint-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [15] . However, their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack [8] , [16] . In 2004, Lin and Lai proposed a flexible biometric-based remote user authentication scheme [8] . Later in 2007, Khan and Zhang showed that Lin and Lai's scheme is insecure against the server spoofing attack [17] . In 2010, Li-Hwang proposed an efficient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [6] . Their scheme is based on biometrics verification, smart card and one-way hash function, and it also uses the random nonce rather than a synchronized clock, and thus it is very efficient in computational cost. However, recently in 2011, Li et al. showed that Li-Hwang's scheme is insecure because Li-Hwang's scheme fails to provide proper authentication and also it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [7] . Unfortunately, in this paper we show that Li et al.'s scheme [7] again fails to provide proper authentication in login and authentication phases because there is no verification on user's entered password after successful verification of his/her biometric template. We also show that due to the same password verification problem Li et al.'s scheme fails to update the new password correctly of a user in password change phase.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Li et al.'s biometricbased remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [7] . We then show the security weaknesses in their scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an improvement of their scheme in order to eliminate weaknesses discussed in Section 3 and then compare performance and functionality of our improved scheme with Li et al.'s scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
REVIEW OF LI ET AL.'S BIOMETRIC-BASED REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this section, for a detailed analysis we review in brief Li et al.'s efficient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme [7] . The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 . 
The hash function is the fingerprint of a file, a message, or other data blocks, and has the following attributes [11] .
• X can be applied to a data block of all sizes.
• For any given variable ) ( , X h X is easy to operate, enabling easy implementation in software and hardware.
• The output length of ) ( X h is fixed.
• Deriving X from the given value ) ( X h Y = and the given hash function ) (⋅ h is computationally infeasible.
• For any given variable X , finding any
• Finding a pair of inputs ) ,
The hash functions have many applications in the field of cryptology and information security, notably in digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other form of authentications and thus it becomes the basis of many cryptographic protocols. One of the fundamental properties of hash functions is that the outputs are very sensitive to small perturbations in their inputs and in general, those cryptographic hash functions cannot be applied straightforwardly when the input data with noisy such as biometrics [9] . If there are few differences between the input each time and this situation will cause the legal user unable to pass biometric authentication. As in [7] , we also use the biometric template matching to perform the biometric authentication in our improved scheme.
Li et al.'s scheme consists of the following four phases, namely, registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase.
Registration Phase
Before the remote user i C logins to the system, i C needs to perform the following steps:
• 
C 's smart card and sends it to i C via secure channel.
• Step 4: i C also enters N into his/her smart card.
Login Phase
When the user i C wants to login to the remote server i S , he/she needs to perform the following steps: 
, where c R is a random number generated by the user,
Authentication Phase
Once the request login message ) , , , (
from the user i C is received, the remote server i S and the user i C perform the following steps for mutual authentication.
Password Change Phase
To freely change the existing password 
CRYPTANALYSIS OF LI ET AL.'S BIOMETRIC-BASED REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this section, we show that the Li et al.'s scheme [7] has the following security weaknesses in their design. 
Li et al.'s Scheme fails to provide strong authentication in Login and Authentication Phases
As a result, we have the following computations: 
THE PROPOSED IMPROVED SCHEME
In this section, we propose an improvement based on Li et al.'s biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The improved scheme keeps the merit of the original Li et al.'s scheme and can withstand the original scheme's security weaknesses discussed in Section 3.
Description of the Improved Scheme
We discuss the registration, login, authentication and password change phases of our proposed scheme.
Registration Phase
When the remote user authentication scheme starts, the user i C and the registration center R need to perform the following steps:
• Step 1: i C chooses a random number N and computes the masked password ) || ( 
Login Phase
The login phase is summarized in Figure 2. 
Authentication Phase
After receiving the request login message
from the user i C , the remote server i S and the user i C perform the following steps for mutual authentication.
• The authentication phase is summarized in Figure 3 . 
Password Change Phase
In Li et al.'s scheme a user can freely change his/her password locally without contacting the registration center. In their scheme, only after the successful biometric template verification, even if the user enters by mistake his/her old password wrongly the value of i e is still updated, which is incorrect. Thus, in next time when the user wants to login in the system, the user's login request will be rejected by the server even the user enters his/her new changed password correctly in that time.
In this phase, we show that in our improved scheme the above mentioned situation will never happen because the smart card always verifies the old entered password by the user before updating the new changed password. The password change phase consists of the following steps:
• PW .
• Step 3: The smart card then computes the following: 
Analysis of the Improved Scheme
In this section, we discuss the security features of the proposed scheme and then compare the performances of the proposed scheme with those for Li et al.'s scheme [7] .
Security Analysis
The proposed scheme resists the man-in-the-middle attacks as in Li et al.'s scheme, because the proposed scheme also retains the merit of the original Li et al.'s scheme. We discuss in the following the security features of our proposed scheme with respect to stolen smart card attacks, strong mutual authentication, replay attacks, security of session key and security of secret key.
• Moreover, the password i PW is unknown to the registration center R . As a result, the proposed scheme can resist insider attacks.
• Strong mutual authentication In the login phase, while constructing • Security of secret key In our proposed scheme, as in [7] [7] the proposed scheme also provides forward secrecy.
Functionality Analysis
Functionality comparison of our improved scheme with Li et al.'s scheme is shown in Table 2 . Due to computational efficiency of hash function, both our scheme and Li et al.'s scheme are very efficient in computation. The proposed scheme provides strong authentication by verifying user's personal biometrics, password, and random nonces generated by the user and server as compared to that for Li et al.'s scheme. Besides this advantage, the proposed scheme supports changing password by the user locally without the help of registration center and updates always correctly the new password replacing the old password in the smart card as compared to that for Li et al. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that Li et al.'s scheme fails to provide strong authentication in both login and authentication phases. We have further shown that Li et al.'s scheme fails to update properly the user's changed password locally without the help of the registration center. We have then proposed an improvement of Li et al.'s biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in order to withstand the above security weaknesses in their scheme. The proposed scheme also keeps the merit of the original Li et al.'s scheme. Our proposed scheme provides strong authentication with the help of verifying biometrics, passwords and random nonces generated by the user and server as compared to that for Li et al.'s scheme. Further, the proposed scheme always updates the new password correctly in the smart card changed by the user freely without the help of registration center.
